University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2005

What Personal Rules Can Teach Us About Basic Institutions
Claire Oakes Finkelstein
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Legal Theory Commons, and the Philosophy Commons

Repository Citation
Finkelstein, Claire Oakes, "What Personal Rules Can Teach Us About Basic Institutions" (2005). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1216.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1216

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

,What Personal Rules Can Teach Us
About Basic Institutions

CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN*

Suppose I am an alcoholic who wishes to sober up.

Assuming I am

rational, it should be simple: Because I prefer a sober life to the life of a
drunk, I have reason to stop drinking.
that simple.

But, as we know, matters are not

For here I am at a cocktail party.

Although I prefer to be

dry than to be an alcoholic, I surely prefer to have this one drink than to
be dry, at least in the moment. If I am rational, therefore, I will have this
drink.

But if I reason this way each time, l will always choose to drink,

and I will remain an alcoholic.
What is to be done?

Perhaps l could check myself into a sanatorium,

where I will be physically prevented from drinking, but this has high costs.

l would need to take a leave of absence from my job; I would be
separated from friends and family. Much better. I think, to quit on my own.
So I settle instead on a rule, a rule I will follow in all situations.

The

rule is this: do not drink. NO\v instead of asking myself whether I would
prefer this drink to momentary sobriety,
personal rule.

I will simply consult my

And because my rule says do not drink, perhaps now I

can take a pass at the party.
But the problem is this: If it was rational for me to accept that drink
before, how can it be rational for me to follow a rule that says to
refrain from drinking?

My rule only stands in my way because

following the rule means refraining from doing something that will
leave me better off, relative to what l novv prefer.

''

Having a drink
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now, after alL need not lead to a further drink; it need not lead to
permanent drunkenness.

But once again, if I reason this way, I will

always choose to drink, and I will end up an alcoholic.
Perhaps therein lies the answer: If I consistently follow the rule, I will
be sober. If I do not follow the rule, I will be a drunk. So following the
rule will benefit me overalL

Thus while not taking this drink may be

suboptimal, from the standpoint of my current preferences, it is part of a
plan of action that is optimal, compared to the feasible alternatives.
This. in and of itself, gives me a reason to follow the rule.
I have suggested that a person who will be benefited by following a
rule has a reason to follow the rule, a reason that makes his following the
rule rational.

Inherent in my suggestion is a more general, and admittedly

controversial, claim, namely that an agent has most reason to adopt that
n10de of reasoning that will benefit him most, even if it commits him to
actions that, considered separately, leave him worse off, relative to his
preferences.

This claim combines what we might call the "benefit

principle," namely that it is rational to make choices according to one's
greatest benefit, with the idea that an agent's mode of reasoning is a
suitable object of choice.

Together they suggest that it is rational to

select one's mode of reasoning according to one's greatest benefit. Thus
if following a personal rule conduces to an improvement in one's overall
welfare, as compared with reasoning case-by-case, the benefit principle
says that it is rational to reason according to personal rules.

Thus it is

rational to select actions in accordance with a rule that dictates not
drinking-not because it is maximally rational to completely refrain
from drinking, but because one can expect to do better by adopting that
rule and sticking to it than by following any other rule or by reasoning
case-by-case.
Notice, crucially, that there is an imp01iant implication of saying that
the benefit principle supplies me with a reason to follow a rule, namely
that it is not necessary for me to bar myself from reconsidering a
personal rule in order to stick to the rule, as other writers in this area
have thought.

I need not cripple myself mentally, in other words, to

stick to a rule on which I have settled. This is even so when I receive
new information that might sway me in the direction of abandoning my
rule. Suppose, for example, I am standing at the cocktail party, conversing
with a cardiologist who is extolling the benefits to me of moderate
drinking.

I have already settled on my rule of not drinking, and have

been successful in sticking to it. The cardiologist, however, tells me that
moderate drinking reduces the risk of heart disease, hea1i attack, and
stroke better than intense and regular cardiovascular exercise.

This

prompts me to reconsider the merits of my rule. While I prefer sobriety
to alcoholism, I now prefer moderate drinking to sobriety.

Do I now
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have a reason to abandon my mle and reach for that drink? And will this
not lead me back to case-by-case reasoning, and so to alcoholism')

It

might be possible for me to revise my mle-to soften it to accommodate
my new preferences. I might, for example, adopt a mle like "drink only
at cocktail parties," or "drink exactly one drink a day.''

Such rules, if

feasible, would be preferable to the more generic rule against drinking.
But personal mles of this sort are typically nebulous and easily finessed.
They quickly collapse into case-by-case reasoning.
It is for this reason that some believers in personal rules

also

recommend a policy of nonreconsideration. Reconsideration, they believe.
will lead me to side with my preferences and so to abandon my rule.
Some reconsideration in the face of new information must be pem1itted.
they allow.

But because reconsideration leads to rule abandonment, it

must be used sparingly.

If the benefit principle is cotTect, however, I

need not side with my immediate preferences when I reconsider.

I can

side instead with what I take myself to have most reason to do, even in
the face of preferences to the contrary.

The point is that it is not

necessary for me to impair my reflective and deliberative capacities in
order to follow a rule.
Notice further that if I did impair my deliberative faculties in order to
stick to my rule, I arguably would not actually be follmving the rule at
all.

Following a mle is a rational activity, distinguishable from various

causal methods one might adopt that bypass reason altogether. Thus 1 might
go to a hypnotist or swallow a pill in order to ensure conformity vvith my
not drinking mle.

But such methods would be causal, not rational.

They

would be a form of internalized precommitment-a psychological version
of joining a sanatorium.

True rule following, however, capitalizes on,

rather than eschews, rational agency.

I am interested in the way in which the benefit principle endorses
adherence to personal mles, among other things, because I think it is of
potential relevance to law.

In particular, I believe it provides us with a

way of approaching fundamental justificatory questions about basic legal
institutions. The question we must ask is whether the rules that govern a
given institution are rationally defensible to each person who must live
under them, even at moments at which that person would maximize his
preferences by abandoning the mle. And this is the question of whether
that

institution

satisfies

the benefit

principle

for

each

individual

contractor whose assent to that institution is required.
The most straightforward application of the benefit principle is in the

7!

area of contract law.

It is easy to see that rational contractors are likely

to favor an institution that forces them to keep contracts, e\·en in cases in
which they would be advantaged by breaking them, as compared with a
regime in which contracts were unenforced. The benefit principle, however,
will also provide us \Vith more specific guidance for institutional rules.
It might make sense of the much maligned doctrine of consideration,
since this is a rule that aims to protect mutuality of benefit. And it might
explain why it is acceptable for cou11s to supply a missing term in a
contract, provided that they thereby give effect to the parties' actual
intentions at the time of contracting, since intentions supply a measure
of the benefits each pany hoped to receive from the contract.
Can the benefit principle help make sense of legal rules in more far
flung settings"

For example, can it help justify an institution like

punishment or tell us what punishments are legitimate? The question we
might ask is whether a rational contractor can regard hin1self as better
off under the rules of that institution than he would be in their absence.
To answer that question, we must ask whether a person who was himself
subject to the rules of the institution would still see himself as faring
better, even once he had to incur their costs, than he would fare in their
absence.

There is reason to think that in many cases, the test wi 11 be

satisfied.

For the deterrent benefits of many penalties will provide

individual contractors with greater benefit in the fonn of security against
the infractions of others than they would lose in welfare by being subject
to the penalty themselves.
Suppose, for example, we wanted to know whether to institute life
sentences for larceny. We \vould compare rhe degree of disadvantage to
an individual contractor who would suffer that penalty with the degree
of advantage to that same individual from living in a society with a rule
protecting private property in rhis \vay.

The latter would be a function

of, first, the marginal deterrent benefits of that penalty relative to nwre
moderate penalties, and second, the significance of the substantive value
that penalty was protecting.

The nom1s protected by a prohibition on

larceny are norms of private ownership, and in the absence of any
punishment for larceny (and like crimes), private ownership would be
eliminated.

Thus each rational contractor should ask himself: Would I

be better off under the tenns of a contract that established penalties for
larceny, assuming that I myself may end up subject to that penalty, than
I would be if there were no private ownership at all? Notice that if the
penalties

for

burglary

are

too

low,

the

deterrent

insignificant, and private property will not be protected.

effect

will

be

If the penalties

arc too high, however. agents receiving the penalty would be worse off
than they would have been in the absence of private property altogether,
and the benefit principle would not be satisfied. The benefit principle, in
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combination with the rational goal of detenence, thus yields specific
1
parameters for the punishment of each separate crime.
This last example illustrates a final point about the benefit principle I
wish to underline.

That principle would not uniquely identify the

institutions that rational agents would adopt.

There are many possible

legal regimes that could satisfy the benefit principle.

My suggestion is

only that rational contracting agents would reject any basic institution
that failed the benefit test.

Satisfying the benefit principle thus provides

a necessary, but not sufficient condition for basic institutions.

What

additional conditions rational contractors would place on the adoption of
basic institutions remains to be developed.

In the case of punishment, I

suggested the additional condition of detenent efficacy.
would have other desiderata.

Other institutions

My aim has merely been to show that a

ce1iain way of looking at rational agency can give specific and plausible
guidance to the task of justifying legal institutions.

I shall unfo!1lmately

have to leave the details for another day.

1

For a fuller discussion of this approach to punishment see generally Claire

Finkelstein, A Contractarian Approach to Punishment, in THE BLACKWELL
GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LA 'vV AND LEGAL THEORY 207 (Martin P.

Golding & William A. Edmunson eds., 2005).
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